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The aim of the study is to investigate two relatively underexplored factors, namely, the
R&D (research and development) capabilities of target firms and the strength of intellectual
property (IP) institutions in target economies, that influences the choice of equity ownership
in cross border acquisitions (CBAs) undertaken by multinational enterprises (MNEs) from
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) economies. They developed the key
hypothesis on foreign market entry through CBAs by incorporating insights from transac-
tion costs economics, the resource-based view and institutional theory to investigate the
determinants of full versus partial equity ownership. Using logistic regression estimation
methods to a sample of 111 CBA deals of BRICS MNEs in 22 European countries, it was
found that BRICS MNEs were likely to pursue full rather than partial acquisition mode
when target firms have high R&D capabilities. However, the greater the degree of strength
of IP institutions in target economies and higher the target firms’ R&D capabilities, the
more likely it is for BRICS MNEs to undertake partial, rather than, full acquisition mode.
They provided interesting theoretical insights and managerial implications that might
underlie some of the key findings on CBAs by emerging market MNEs.
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1. Introduction
Cross border acquisitions (CBAs) are an impor-tant and increasingly popular strategy for for-
eign market entry (Contractor et al., 2014). While
developed countries multinationals (DMNEs) are car-
rying out CBAs around the world, the last two deca-
des have witnessed an increasing number of CBAs
initiated by emerging market multinational enter-
prises (EMNEs) (Gaffney et al., 2016) particularly
from large emerging economies such as Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). The
share of emerging economies in world outward for-
eign direct investment (OFDI) flows has now reached
39%, and a significant part of emerging economies’
outward FDI is utilised in undertaking CBAs
(UNCTAD, 2015).
The resource-based view (RBV) indicates that a
full acquisition endows the acquirer with unified own-
ership of its target and majority control rights to inte-
grate and exploit the combined resource base (Peng,
2001). However, in carrying out CBAs, the acquirer
may not fully own the target firm and in some cases, a
foreign target firm could be partially owned by the
acquirer (Contractor et al., 2014). Partial acquisitions
offer limited ownership and minority control rights
because the acquirer does not undertake complete
equity ownership of the target firm. Therefore, full
acquisitions, compared with partial ones, entail higher
investments in human, physical and intangible assets,
and greater overall commitment (Chen, 2008). In line
with this reasoning, given the significant implications
of the choice of equity ownership for resource com-
mitment, risk, returns and control, a better understand-
ing of the determinants of ownership choice in CBAs
can contribute extensively to the literature on
decision-making of foreign market entry modes
(Chari and Chang, 2009).
Despite the topical as well as academic importance
of this issue, ownership decision in CBAs is relatively
under-researched in comparison to other issues of
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) such as knowledge
transfer (e.g., Junni et al., 2015a,b; Ahammad et al.,
2016a,b) post-acquisition integration dynamics (e.g.,
Gomes et al., 2013), M&A and innovation (e.g., Bauer
et al., 2016) and post-acquisition performance (e.g.,
Weber et al., 2011; Weber and Tarba, 2011; Bauer and
Matzler, 2014; Zhang et al., 2015). Only a few studies
have explored the circumstances surrounding MNEs’
preferences for partial or full acquisitions. For
instance, Chen and Hennart (2004) found that asym-
metric information is one reason for MNEs to resort to
partial CBAs. Chen (2008) suggested that partial
CBAs are mostly chosen as a means for capacity
control in mature industries and speedy entry into rap-
idly growing markets. Elango et al. (2013) ascertains
that partial acquisitions are preferred over full acquisi-
tions if target firms are situated in high-technology
industries. However, when acquirers have a high
degree of acquisition experience and when their tar-
gets are in institutionally distant countries, they are
likely to resort to full acquisitions. Contractor et al.
(2014) further extends the concept of ‘distance’ by
explaining how the likelihood of partial over majority
or full acquisitions becomes greater when low institu-
tional distance or high uncertainty avoidance are
involved in acquisitions. Malhotra et al. (2016) by
comparing U.S. multinationals with Latin American
firms find that the latter group demonstrate a greater
propensity to opt for full ownership as cross-national
uncertainty increases. A very recent study also finds
that high cultural distance between host and target
economies manifested through differences in
individual-collectivism and uncertainty avoidance
drives British acquirers to opt for partial acquisitions
in both developed and emerging economies (Aham-
mad et al., 2016a,b).
The small but growing literature on factors influ-
encing the share of equity sought in CBAs has
enhanced our understanding. However, some research
gaps remain. Firstly, while prior studies examined the
impact of cultural distance (Contractor et al., 2014)
and country risk (Chari and Chang, 2009) on the share
of equity, scant research exists examining the impact
of R&D capabilities and strength of intellectual prop-
erty (IP) institutions on the choice of equity ownership
share sought in CBAs. Secondly, prior research inves-
tigating choice of equity ownership has focused on
MNEs from developed countries investing in other
developed or emerging markets. However, limited
research exists as to the determinants of the share of
equity pursued in CBAs by EMNEs in developed
countries. Therefore, the aim of our study is to exam-
ine the two relevant but underexplored factors,
namely, R&D capabilities and degree of strength of
IP institutions on the choice of equity ownership in
CBAs (in European countries) by BRICSMNEs.
The first contribution of this article is the investiga-
tion of a major determinant related to knowledge
based assets (KBAs) of target firms that drives the
choice of equity ownership share sought by BRICS
MNEs’ in European countries. Developed countries
MNEs’ with high level of R&D capabilities are more
likely to exploit significant amount of KBAs in inter-
national markets (Slangen and Hennart, 2007). These
KBAs constitute an integral part of RBV, where
Barney (1991) referred to the importance of knowl-
edge in a firm’s strategies, both domestic and globally.
However, EMNEs may either completely lack or
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possess relatively underdeveloped KBAs such as
technological or R&D capabilities – that underpin the
success of established MNEs (Makino et al., 2002;
Deng, 2009; Ramamurti, 2009). Furthermore,
EMNEs as late entrants in world markets may find
that the most attractive KBAs – R&D capabilities
being one of them are possessed by firms located out-
side their home country (Buckley et al., 2016). There-
fore, R&D capabilities of the target firms in
developed countries may play a vital role in deciding
the choice of equity ownership sought in CBAs.
Recent literature has documented the effects of var-
ious factors on MNE entry mode choice in foreign
markets, particularly, the choice between Greenfield,
Joint-venture or acquisitions (partial or full). How-
ever, only a handful of these studies have dealt with
the effect and contribution of R&D capabilities and
technological innovation levels (in both home and
host or acquirer and seller, firms) on these choices. In
some cases, researchers studied these aspects in a lim-
ited context, for example, in the context of Japanese
firms entering the U.S. market (Hennart and Park,
1993; Chen and Hennart, 2004) or into the European
market. Yet again, the results of these studies and of
others are ambiguous and inconclusive. R&D capabil-
ities and technological innovation levels in developed
countries are indicative of the market growth potential
and the endowment of important KBAs that laggard
firms pursue in order to improve their technological
position within an industry (Bannert and Tschirky,
2004; Chen and Hennart, 2004). This is probably even
more prominent for EMNEs including BRICS firms
that are attracted to these markets. Our article attempts
to address this gap.
The second contribution of this article relates to
investigating the strength of national IP institutions
and their effects on choice of MNEs’ equity owner-
ship share in CBAs. The strength of IP institutions of
host economies affects the volume of inward FDI
flows (and consequently CBA activities) in host coun-
tries (Javorcik, 2004; Khoury and Peng, 2011;
Ushijima, 2013). This is because strong IP institutions
decrease uncertainty and provide efficient protection
to IP owning firms against imitating competitor firms,
enabling them to more efficiently exploit their KBAs
(Teece, 1986) and often achieving higher IP commer-
cialization values (Gans et al., 2008). Given the effect
that the strength of IP institutions have on the value
and potential for exploitation of the CBAs of target
firms, the acquiring firm needs to ex ante recognize
potential misinformation or misrepresentation of
information by the acquired firm (Chen and Hennart,
2004). In countries with relatively strong IP institu-
tions, misinformation related to KBAs being poten-
tially vulnerable to IP litigation activities from
competing firms can lead to the ex-post diminishment
of the value of acquired KBAs. In this article, we
study the effect of the strength of IP institutions on
preferences for partial and full CBAs in European
countries, as well as the differential effect when the
value of KBAs’ in the target firms is high and the
acquisition takes place in European countries boasting
strong as well as weak IP institutions.
There are currently no studies that research the
effect of the strength of IP institutions on interna-
tional acquisitions. While there are a number of
articles in the literature that studied the effects of IP
institutions on, for example, FDI (Khoury and Peng,
2011; Ushijima, 2013), licensing (Papageorgiadis
et al., 2013), the effects on international acquisition
have not been conceptualised and empirically investi-
gated. This is especially the case when considering
the international acquisition activities of EMNEs.
Given the growing importance of IP institutions over
the last two decades, it is important to gain a better
understanding about the way that IP institutions with
different levels of strength affect the international
acquisition activities of EMNEs and particularly firms
from BRICS countries.
The organisation of the article is as follows. A
review of the existing literature resulting in hypothesis
development is provided in Section 2 and the dataset
and estimation method are outlined in Section 3. Sec-
tion 4 provides a discussion of the key findings and
Section 5 concludes with theoretical implications, man-
agerial implications and limitations of the research.
2. Theoretical framework and
hypothesis development
International business (IB) as a research area is multi-
disciplinary in nature and multiple theoretical per-
spectives are applicable to research contexts
(Brouthers and Hennart, 2007; Slangen and Hennart,
2008). Moreover, IB entry mode decisions and strat-
egies have been analysed in many cases by using mul-
tiple theoretical frameworks, with transaction cost
economics (TCE), resource-based view (RBV), and
institutional theory emerging as the most often and
commonly used ones (Canabal and White, 2008).
Thus, our study attempts to analyse the key determi-
nants of acquisitions entry strategy of MNEs from
BRICS based on theoretical insights from TCE, RBV
and institutional theory. Our choice of combining
multiple theoretical perspectives is further signified
by the fact that the IB literature using TCE, RBV and
institutional theory have conceptualised and opera-
tionalized a similar range of variables on market entry
mode (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007; Dikova and van
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Witteloostuijn, 2007; Arslan and Larimo, 2012;
Dikova, 2012).
2.1. R&D capabilities
It has been established in past IB literature that MNEs
with a high level of R&D capability are likely to better
exploit their KBAs in international markets (Slangen
and Hennart, 2007). R&D capabilities are also critical
for developing an ambidextrous organisation (Junni
et al., 2013, 2015a, 2015b). As indicated earlier,
KBAs constitute an integral part of RBV. It should be
further noted that MNEs operating in industry with
high level of R&D capabilities are likely to transfer a
significant amount of KBAs to their affiliates. How-
ever, if these foreign-owned affiliates are the result of
acquisition of local firms, then the management prob-
lems can be a significant problem for MNE acquirers
(Hennart and Park, 1993). MNE acquirers can be fur-
ther expected to face great difficulties in pricing the
technology and enforcing the contracts in case of a
joint establishment (Hennart, 1991). Past literature fur-
ther establishes that MNEs with high R&D expenses
tend to prefer full ownership in order to completely
control their proprietary know-how as well as best
exploit such know-how in their international markets
(e.g., Padmanabhan and Cho, 1996).
Previous research on foreign market entry (e.g.,
Anand and Delios, 2002; Tseng et al., 2007) also
agree that the significance of resources becomes even
more important in the case of CBAs because acquisi-
tions usually demand a higher degree of resource
commitment by the acquirer firm. The resources are
needed right from the pre-acquisition phase that
requires target identification and valuation, until the
post-acquisition phase that deals with the integration
of the acquired firm. The need for greater resources
arises because the cost of acquiring an existing firm is
usually more than that of setting up a new venture and
the acquiring firmmay use the acquisition to diversify
into a new business. Firms, however, face constraints
both in terms of the quantity and type of resources
required in making CBAs (Tseng et al., 2007).
The resource constraint problem is more serious in
relation to MNEs from BRICS. Prior research sug-
gests that firms originating from emerging economies
may lack the resources, especially KBAs, which
underpin success in foreign markets (Dunning et al.,
2008; Rui and Yip, 2008; Gammeltoft, et al, 2010).
Facing serious resource limitations, EMNEs needs
external resources that not only compensate for exist-
ing knowledge-based resource deficiencies, but also
accelerate its internationalisation (Mathews, 2006;
Luo and Rui, 2009; Ambos and Ambos, 2011). In
addition, R&D capability are often resources that are
critical to the creation of long-term competitive
advantage for firms. Valuable, unique and difficult to
imitate R&D capabilities are necessary for sustainable
competitive advantage. However, firms from emerg-
ing markets tend to lack such unique and valuable
R&D capabilities. Thus, MNEs from BRICS econo-
mies in their search for strategic KBAs will target
firms with high R&D capabilities. However, a partial
acquisition will not provide EMNE complete control
and ownership of the R&D capabilities. Conse-
quently, a partial acquisition may limit EMNE’s abil-
ity to exclusively extract the benefits target firm’s
R&D capabilities. To gain greater operational control
over the R&D capabilities of target firms from devel-
oped economies, MNEs from BRICS are more likely
to pursue a full acquisition. Therefore, based on the
RBV, MNEs from BRICS will pursue a full acquisi-
tion when the target firms have high R&D capabil-
ities. In line with this argument, we propose the
following hypothesis:
H1: The greater the degree of R&D capabilities
in target firms, the more likely it is for EMNEs
to undertake full rather than partial acquisitions.
2.2. Strength of IP institutions and EMNE
acquisition mode
The strength of national IP institutions shapes capabil-
ities of firms to successfully exploit their investments
in R&D (Varsakelis, 2001; James et al., 2013; Wu
et al., 2016). This is because the effectiveness of a
national IP institution influences the appropriation
strategy, investment decision, technology manage-
ment and the overall R&D performance of firms
(Meyer and Nguyen, 2005; Chan et al., 2008; Henisz
and Swaminathan, 2008). Firms assess the strength of
the IP institutional conditions of the country where
they operate in and modify the level of control that
they need to exercise over their R&D investments, the
boundaries of their firm, as well as decisions related to
developing and employing complementary assets to
exert control over the appropriation of their innova-
tions (Pisano, 2006; Teece, 2007). Operating in coun-
tries boasting strong IP institutions is desirable for
MNEs because strong IP institutions decrease uncer-
tainty, provide protection, and enable firms to exploit
their investments in R&D more efficiently by block-
ing potential imitators (Teece, 1986). Strong IP insti-
tutions also enable the efficient identification of
potential IP infringements in a clear, orderly and rela-
tively (to weak IP systems) low cost way. This allows
IP owning firms to realize and appropriate the maxi-
mum value of their innovation through internal or
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external IP exploitation. More importantly, firms that
have established a strong R&D and innovation posi-
tion will be better placed to defend the rights accruing
from their innovations via litigation or out-of-court
settlement (James et al., 2013). The potential or actual
enforceability of R&D investments and IP assets in a
strong and efficient IP system provide certainty to
investors and can lead to higher commercialization
values (Gans et al., 2008). Therefore, operating in
strong IP institutions can allow firms to achieve stron-
ger R&D performance and higher returns to their
R&D investments.
The home countries of EMNEs are predominantly
characterised by weak IP institutions (Papageorgiadis
et al., 2014) and their R&D and innovation positions
are generally weaker to those of firms from developed
countries (Luo and Tung, 2007). Due to their modest
capabilities related to R&D investments and IP man-
agement, they do not use IP ligation (and out of court
settlements) against potential IP infringers since the
difficulty and cost required to identify IP infringe-
ments is high and the outcome of IP litigation in coun-
tries with weak IP institutions is uncertain (James
et al., 2013). EMNEs invest in R&D but they are
more likely to develop modest technological develop-
ments whose value is often appropriated with the
application of complementary know-how and resour-
ces owned by the EMNE internally. Although the
inventive step, novelty and potential enforceability of
their IP can be questionable, they are not confronted
with the uncertainty of potential IP litigation from
competing firms that could affect their commerciali-
zation model, due to the same difficulties that other
firms face when operating in weak IP institutions
(Sepetys and Cox, 2009). While the weak IP institu-
tional context is not a barrier for EMNEs to exploit
their investments in R&D at home, it can become a
problem when investing abroad. This is currently the
case for the Chinese electronics firm Xiaomi Inc.
which is highly successful in its home market but its
attempts to invest abroad were blocked or experience
severe delays due to competitors filling patent
infringement lawsuits against Xiaomi in the US
(SCMP, 2015), South Korea (IAM, 2016) and India
(Bloomberg, 2014). Xiaomi’s friction with the weak
home IP institutions did not lead to the development
of strong internal capabilities that would anticipate IP
litigation from competing firms and proactively scru-
tinize, elevate and armour the firms R&D activities
and output. Xiaomi, therefore, does not have the
appropriate capabilities that would enable the success-
ful exploitation of their R&D efforts and their estab-
lished business model in host countries with strong IP
institutions yet.
The strength of the IP institution of a host country
influences the choice of EMNEs to undertake a full or
partial acquisition. First, since the strength of the host
country IP institution determines the enforceability and
therefore the extent of the appropriation value of the
acquired firm, EMNEs has a strong incentive to fully
acquire firms operating in countries with strong IP
institutions. This is because in strong IP institutions,
the full acquisition of the investments in R&D is
expected to achieve strong enforceability and, there-
fore, reach higher appropriability value. EMNEs under-
taking a full acquisition will be able to boost their
earnings and profitability by achieving high investment
returns and exploiting these in their entirety. This is
especially desirable since EMNEs acquiring firms in
strong IP institutions often pay a premium in order to
successfully complete the acquisition (Coff, 2003).
Second, EMNEs will experience high IP institutional
distance when investing in host countries with strong
IP institutions. This will require EMNEs to facilitate
organizational learning in order to develop their capa-
bilities related to managing R&D investments in strong
IP institutions (similar to the example of Xiaomi). In
the case of a partial acquisition, the IP institutional dis-
tance can increase the integration costs faced by the
EMNE since the superior knowhow of the acquired
firm may lead to power imbalance and the two distinct
innovation cultures may clash which can act as an
obstacle to the successful co-operation between the
two parties (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005; Cording
et al., 2008). The choice of acquisition targets of
EMNEs that are located in European countries are
likely to be influenced heavily by IP institutions since
the strength of European IP institutions ranges from
weak institutions similar to those in BRICS countries,
to moderate, and strong (Papageorgiadis et al., 2014).
A full acquisition will enable the EMNE to avoid
potential power imbalance and co-ordination chal-
lenges with the acquired firm.We therefore propose:
H2a: The greater the strength of IP institutions
in target countries, the more likely it is for
EMNEs to undertake full rather than partial
acquisitions.
A common issue with acquisitions recognized by
Chen and Hennart (2004, p. 1127) is that ‘MNEs mak-
ing acquisitions abroad must incur substantial costs to
screen the targets and enforce the contracts, and leav-
ing a stake to the sellers. . .can be a powerful way to
reduce these costs’. Such screening difficulties are
especially prevalent in the case of pre-acquisition
inspections of companies with strong R&D invest-
ments, since these are difficult to evaluate due to
information asymmetry (Reuer and Koza, 2000).
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Information asymmetry relates to the difficulty of ex-
ante recognizing potential misinformation or misrep-
resentation of information by the seller (Chen and
Hennart, 2004). In the case of firms with strong R&D
investments in countries with strong IP institutions,
misrepresented information can relate to, for example,
the potential of IP infringement lawsuits that the firm
on sale may be about to face or may face in the future
due to the nature of its R&D output and commerciali-
zation. When an EMNE fully acquires such a firm in a
country where IP institutions are strong, this type of
misinformation is more likely to lead to expensive
legal battles and (potentially) to the diminishment of
the acquired R&D assets.
The degree of information asymmetry in relation to
IP misinformation or misrepresentation in acquisi-
tions is reduced when the acquiring firm has strong
internal capabilities that can enable it to ex-ante assess
and confidently determine if the R&D and associated
intangible resources of the target firm could be
infringing the IP of competitors. Firms with strong IP
management capabilities have experienced teams of
in-house IP councillors who have advanced under-
standing of the IP density in the relevant technological
fields (through the mapping of overlapping IP rights
internationally) and experience with the international
IP protection and litigation landscape (Pitkethly,
2001). Such IP management teams are better posi-
tioned to identify potentially costly IP risks in a pro-
posed acquisition by scanning the IP portfolio of a
target firm, both in terms of current and future
patented technology as well as of intangible assets
that are protected via other IP mechanisms such
as trade secrets and product design complexity
(Liebeskind, 1997; De Faria and Sofka, 2010).
The modest internal IP capabilities of EMNEs can
lead to higher levels of information asymmetry espe-
cially when targeting to acquire firms with strong
R&D investments. EMNEs often have limited experi-
ence of managing and appropriating strong IP portfo-
lios internationally, which leaves them vulnerable to
high levels of IP risk due to information asymmetry
especially in countries with strong IP institutions.
This was the experience that the Hon Hai/Foxconn
Technology Group (Foxconn) was faced with in their
attempt to acquire the Japanese technology company,
Sharp Corporation (Sharp). After a long negotiation
process, Foxconn offered approximately $5.3 billion
to acquire Sharp on January 2016 (WSJ, 2016). On
the 25th of February 2016, the board of Sharp agreed
to the sale, however the signing of the takeover agree-
ment was postponed due to new evidence that Sharp
revealed to Foxconn on the night before the agree-
ment (FT, 2016a). According to the news reports (FT,
2016b) ‘. . .the Japanese company’s officials
unexpectedly submitted a list of about 100 items in
contingent liabilities involving intellectual property
lawsuits and patent infringement claims. . .It was dis-
ingenuous, one person close to Foxconn said. But the
material information that Sharp revealed did not
require formal disclosure’. While the information
related to worst case scenarios, Foxconn proceeded
with the deal, since accessing the strong IP, patents
and high technology of a company that is consistently
operating in strong IP environments was deemed to be
important for the future of Foxconn. To do so how-
ever, Foxconn offered in the negotiations to take a
partial but controlling stake of the company and not to
replace Sharp’s top management, not change the
structure of the company, and not to make employees
redundant (FT, 2016b; WSJ, 2016).
Overall, Chen and Hennart (2004, p. 1126) suggest
that in such occasions, foreign firms will prefer partial
acquisitions since this mode allows the acquiring firm to
‘create a hostage effect that facilitates ex ante screening
of targets and ex post enforcement of contracts’. There-
fore, due to the information asymmetry between
EMNEs and target firms with strong R&D capabilities
in countries with strong IP institutions, we expect
EMNEs to partially acquire the target firms, in order to
take advantage of the ‘hostage effect’ and reduce their
monitoring costs and uncertainty.We therefore propose:
H2b: The greater the strength of IP institu-
tions in target countries and the higher the
level of the R&D capabilities of the target
firm, the more likely it is for EMNEs to
undertake partial rather than full acquisitions.
2.3. Industry relatedness
It is well established in the literature that industry
relatedness is a major factor influencing the share of
equity ownership of foreign firms in CBAs. Charac-
terized by the distance or difference in the industry
between the target firm and the acquiring firm, indus-
try relatedness offers certain advantages for the
acquirer. Contractor et al. (2014) assessed the distance
or difference in the industry (sectoral) experience of
the acquirer and that of the target company. They have
defined sectoral distance as the extent of dis-similarity
in the knowledge-base, business practices, routines,
norms, and general competitive environment that
exists between the target firm’s industry and the
acquirer’s industry (Contractor et al., 2014). Acquirers
should perceive acquisitions of targets with low sec-
toral distance as less risky. It lowers information
asymmetry and reduces uncertainty, making transition
and adjustments easier (Morosini et al., 1998; Lien
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and Klein, 2009). Moreover, acquiring firm has a
lower risk of overestimating the target firm and its
assets and making erroneous managerial decisions
(Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993). Malhotra et al. (2011)
argued that because of the familiarity with the target
industry, the acquiring firm would less likely fall prey
to the target firm’s opportunistic behaviour. They have
postulated that the benefits for acquiring firms in seek-
ing for lower equity ownership – which help in over-
coming the high costs in screening target firms and
evaluating their true value – is reduced and therefore
acquirers making related acquisitions are more likely
to opt for higher equity ownership (Malhotra et al.,
2011). Chen and Hennart (2004), examined the equity
choices of Japanese firms acquiring U.S. firms, and
Chari and Chang (2009), who studied cross-border
acquisitions by U.S. firms, concluded that industry un-
relatedness, leads to lower shares of equity ownership
sought in host firms. Contractor et al. (2014) further
suggested that when the sectoral distance between
acquirer and target is low, acquirers are able to absorb
knowledge more quickly and develop strategies for
completing the acquisition processes (including post-
acquisition management integration) in an efficient
manner. They hypothesized that the advantages for
CBAs with industry relatedness emanating from
reduced uncertainty will be most easily achievable in
a full acquisition and less easily achievable in a minor-
ity acquisition (Contractor et al., 2014). Consistent
with the above arguments with respect to industry
relatedness, we hypothesise for EMNE as follows:
H3: EMNEs are more likely to pursue full than
partial acquisitions, when EMNE acquirers are
in the same industry as their targets.
3. Methodology
3.1. Data and variables
The data for acquirer-target firms for the study has
been compiled in two stages. In the first stage, the
CBA (cross-border acquisitions) deal data for BRICS
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) firms
acquiring in European countries were collected using
the OSIRIS database. To ensure that we had a suffi-
ciently large sample, we looked for all CBA deals
over 1 million US$ that occurred between the time-
period 1998 and 2014. This exercise resulted in 1,028
CBA deals and it included key information such as
deal valuation, effective date of commencement,
acquirer/target industry characteristics and the per-
centage of equity share in target firm owned by BRICS
acquirers. In the second stage, key financial informa-
tion pertaining to the European target firms such as
R&D investment, total sales, assets (fixed and intangi-
ble), profits and number of employees were collected
using the AMADEUS, Bureau Van Djik database.
The relevant data and information acquired in both
stages were then merged to compile the CBA dataset
required to test the key hypotheses of this study.
Since one of the key variables of interest is the
R&D capabilities of target firms, all target firms that
did not report information on R&D investment were
dropped. This exercise lead to a significant number of
European target firms being dropped from the dataset.
The final selection process yielded a sample of 111
CBA carried out by BRICS MNEs from 1998 to
2013 in 42 industries (US-SIC 4-digit level). The sam-
ple included target firms from 22 European countries
(see Table 1 for details on acquirer-target nationality).
An important variable that contributes to the dis-
tinctiveness of this study is the measurement of the
strength of IP institutions in the host markets of tar-
get firms. We approximate for the strength of IP
institutions using the updated international patent
systems strength index developed by Papageorgia-
dis et al. (2014) and more specifically, by assigning
scores from this index to European target firms
from the sample across all relevant firm-years. The
index of Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) goes beyond
the measurement of the book-law effects of the pat-
ent system as captured by the Park (2008) index and
focuses on the strength of enforcement related
aspects of national patent systems (Papageorgiadis
et al., 2013, 2014; Papageorgiadis and Sharma,
Table 1. Nationality of acquirer and target firms
Acquiror nationality Target nationality
Brazil (19) Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark
Russia (19) Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy
India (23) Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania
China (39) Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey
South Africa (11) Ukraine, United Kingdom
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2015). As Papageorgiadis et al. (2014, p. 586) sug-
gest the index of patent systems strength ‘. . .places
particular emphasis on the effectiveness of enforce-
ment practices, together with the overall adminis-
trative functioning of the system as perceived by
managers’. This attribute of the index is important
for this study since the scores of the book-law pat-
ent protection index of Park (2008) have little var-
iance between European countries, whereas the
scores of the index of patent systems strength by
Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) clearly vary between
European countries. In addition, the latest update of
the index by Park (2008) provides scores for the
year 2005, whereas the latest update of the Papa-
georgiadis et al. (2014) provides annual scores for
the years 1998–2014.1
3.1.1. Dependent variable
Acquisition type: We use a binary variable where full
acquisition (i.e., 100% equity share) equals to 1 and
partial acquisition (i.e., 10%–99%) equals to 0 (fol-
lowing Chari and Chang, 2009).
3.1.2. Explanatory variables
R&D intensity (TG R&D ratio): In order to capture
R&D capabilities of target firms, we follow Chen and
Hennart (2004) operationalization of the same vari-
able where the ratio of R&D investment to total sales
of firms’ is used. Strong R&D capabilities of target
firms should encourage BRICS MNEs to undertake
full rather than partial acquisitions (H1).
IP institutions (TG IP institutions): As reported ear-
lier, the strength of IP institutions across European
firms is approximated by assigning a score using the
updated index of patent systems strength of Papageor-
giadis et al. (2014) to each target firm based on the
country where they operate. As hypothesized in H2a,
the stronger the IP institutions in target countries, the
more likely it is for BRICS MNEs to undertake full
rather than partial acquisitions.
Industry relatedness: Following Chari and Chang
(2009), we also measured whether target firms were
from the same or different industry by comparing the
primary SICs of BRICS firms with European target
firms at four-digit level. The observations are coded
as involving a target firm from the same (or different)
industry by the acquirer. Target firms from the same
industry as the acquirer were coded as 1 whereas tar-
get firms from a different industry to that of acquirer
were coded as 0. The logic implied here is that when
BRICS acquirers are from the same industry as their
targets, the more likely it is for them to undertake full
rather than partial acquisitions (H3).
3.1.3. Control variables
Target firm size: Chari and Chang (2009) argued that
the cost of separating desired assets from non-desired
assets is likely to be greater in larger target firms than
in smaller target firms. In this study, we measure tar-
get firm size as the logarithm of number of employees,
since the higher cost of restructuring in large firms is
more likely to arise from the greater numbers of
employees and activities to be restructured (Oh et al.,
2014; Kavadis and Casta~ner, 2015; Ahammad et al.,
forthcoming). We also use the logarithm of sales as an
alternative for robustness check.
Target firm performance: We also control for the
performance of target firm since it has been argued
the firm performance can be seen as an overall proxy
for the possession of intangible advantages by firms
(Shaver and Flyer, 2000). We operationalize this con-
struct by use target firms return on assets (ROA). We
also use the profit ratio as an alternative for robustness
check.
Country risk: According to transaction cost theory,
country risk is a major source of exogenous uncer-
tainty and therefore is likely to be associated with low
level of ownership. In line with Contractor et al.
(2014), we measure country risk using the six gover-
nance indicators namely: accountability, political sta-
bility, government effectiveness, regulatory quality,
rule of law and corruption control. To reduce the num-
ber of measures, we take the average of those indica-
tors and reverse-coded the average scores, as ensured
by Chari and Chang (2009), to allow a positive associ-
ation between the country score and risk. Different
from Contractor et al. (2014) and Chari and Chang
(2009), our study focuses on acquisitions by emerging
economy multinationals with ample experience of
volatile markets and bad economic policies of their
home countries. Therefore, we expect the effect of
country risk on the choice of equity ownership share
by emerging market multinationals to be less
prevalent.
Cultural distance: To control for cultural distance,
we include the uncertainty avoidance distance
between acquirer country and target firm country.
This is calculated as the absolute difference between
the uncertainty avoidance of the acquirer country and
the target country. Evidently, both Chari and Chang
(2009), and Contractor et al. (2014) find the uncer-
tainty avoidance between home and host country is
negatively associated with the share of equity sought
by acquirers.
Deal size: Following Contractor et al. (2014), we
also include the deal size, representing the transaction
value paid by the acquirer to the target firm. We mea-
sure the deal size as the logarithm of transaction val-
ues obtained fromOSIRIS database.
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3.2. Methods
We use a logistic regression model, following Hosmer
and Lemeshow (2000) and Martin (1996) to model
the choice of acquisitions as a function of R&D capa-
bilities, patent enforcement and industry relatedness.
As our dependent variable is binary, the use of a bino-
mial logit model rather than ordinary least squares
regression is appropriate given the advantages this
approach demonstrates in handling conditional proba-
bilities (Shalizi, 2015). We pooled financial data of
target firms over a 3-year period and controlled time-
period of the deals using dummy variables for each
year. We also use industry dummies to control for any
unobserved heterogeneity that might vary across dif-
ferent industries. Finally, we address issues related to
endogeneity that might affect the estimation method.
We conducted a t-test on the difference between cur-
rent and lagged R&D intensity of target firms to check
if the CBA deal has any effect on the R&D intensity
of target firms. We found there are no statistically sig-
nificant differences between the two indicating that
the CBA deal has little effect on target firms’ R&D
intensity. Also, we run additional regressions with
2-year average R&D intensity prior to the CBA deal
and found similar results.
4. Results
Table 2 presents the descriptive analysis of the variables
along with the correlation between the key variables of
interest. The correlation matrix suggests that apart from
high correlation between TG R&D ratio*TG Patent
enforcement interaction and TGR&D ratio, collinearity
is not a severe problem. In addition, we conducted tests
on variance inflation factor (VIF). The mean VIFs are
all within the threshold tolerance (below 10) as sug-
gested in the literature (Hair et al., 1995; Rogerson,
2001). Table 3 presents the results for all our regression
models. Model 1 is our preferred model in which the
target firm size is measured by the logarithm of number
of employees and the target firm performance is proxied
by return on assets (ROA). Model 2, 3 and 4 use alter-
native combinations of target firm size and performance
measures such as profit ratio, return on assets and loga-
rithm of sales for the purpose of robustness check. All
four models are statistically significant, as indicated by
the chi-square test statistics. Also, the Pseudo R squared
and the percentage of correct predictions in all four
models are similar, indicating using alternative meas-
ures of target firm size and performance has little effect
on the consistency of our results. In the following sec-
tion, for brevity we shall focus our discussion based on
model 1 results including marginal effects reported in
columnModel 1 (2).
From model 1 results, we find that H1 is supported.
The coefficient for TG R&D ratio is positive and stat-
istically significant at P< 0.01 level. The findings
tend to suggest that EMNEs are more likely to pursue
full acquisition when the degree of R&D capabilities
in target firms from developed countries is higher.
We also find that H2a is supported. The coefficient
for TG IP institutions is positive and significant at
P< 0.10 level and the evidence suggests that the
strength of IP institutions of European countries has
an important determinant effect on EMNEs invest-
ment in full rather than partial acquisitions.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix
Variable name Mean SD Correlation coefficients
Acquisition 0.49 0.5 1.00
TG IP institutions (1) 7.24 1.94 0.29* 1.00
TG R&D ratio (2) 0.33 0.34 0.04 0.01 1.00
Interaction between
(1) and (2)
2.37 2.7 0.06 0.17 0.96* 1.00
Industry relatedness 0.44 0.50 0.00 20.01 0.21* 0.22* 1.00
Ln (deal size) 3.82 1.97 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.07 20.01 1.00
Ln (TG size):
employment
5.02 1.2220.05 20.01 0.23* 0.22* 0.0620.10 1.00
Ln (TG size):
Total sales
9.97 1.62 0.02 0.01 0.18 0.15 20.15 0.00 0.17 1.00
TG return on assets 23.13 24.98 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.07 0.0520.02 0.15 0.84* 1.00
TG profit ratio 0.35 9.04 0.04 20.05 20.52*20.49*20.03 0.07 0.00 0.16 0.30* 1.00
cultural distance 25.56 17.9920.09 20.07 20.19*20.19*20.17 0.06 0.0020.03 20.01 0.46* 1.00
TG country risk 1.23 0.5220.02 20.19*20.02 20.07 20.0220.07 0.16 0.06 0.08 0.03 20.07 1.00
*Significant at 5%.
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Table 3. Logistic regression results for determinants of full versus partial acquisitions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1
Marginal Effect
TG R&D ratio (1) 18.13*** 13.59** 18.99*** 13.76** 4.45
[6.289] [5.445] [6.564] [5.568]
TG IP institution (2) 1.281* 1.131* 1.292* 1.126* 0.3129
[0.687] [0.676] [0.707] [0.675]
Interaction between (1) and (2) 22.050*** 21.729** 22.141*** 21.746** 20.502
[0.741] [0.680] [0.770] [0.696]
Industry relatedness 20.154 0.130 20.146 0.132 20.035
[0.657] [0.596] [0.648] [0.591]
Ln (deal size) 1.488 1.919* 1.414 1.924* 0.372
[1.019] [1.041] [1.004] [1.042]
Cultural distance 0.00736 0.00645 0.00770 0.00617 0.002
[0.0178] [0.0178] [0.0178] [0.0178]
TG country risk 20.0318 20.00296 0.121 0.0253 0.003
[1.940] [2.021] [1.997] [2.009]
Ln (TG employment) 20.183 0.0344 20.435
[0.259] [0.221]
TG return on assets 0.0299* 0.0334** 0.007
[0.0159] [0.0167]
TG profit ratio 20.0383 20.0385
[0.0312] [0.0314]
Ln (TG sales) 20.228 20.00894
[0.225] [0.180]
Intercept 216.29** 219.11** 214.71** 218.91**
[7.397] [7.521] [7.331] [7.640]
Energy and power 25.012** 24.659** 24.907** 24.652**
[2.143] [2.213] [2.139] [2.212]
Financial 25.015* 23.599 25.227* 23.687
[2.895] [2.856] [2.916] [2.868]
Healthcare 24.354* 24.310* 24.471** 24.391*
[2.226] [2.403] [2.274] [2.433]
High-tech 23.414* 23.248 23.501* 23.256
[1.883] [2.121] [1.931] [2.147]
Industrial 23.203 22.973 23.321* 23.018
[1.953] [2.142] [2.004] [2.175]
Materials 26.374*** 26.073*** 26.488*** 26.111***
[2.112] [2.291] [2.150] [2.319]
Telecommunications 23.173 22.632 23.304 22.678
[2.123] [2.233] [2.146] [2.258]
Year dummies Included Included Included Included
N 111 111 111 111
Wald statistics 45.41** 44.01** 45.95** 43.33**
Pseudo R2 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.29
Correctly predicted 75% 71% 76% 71%
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*Significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
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In the case of results for H2b, the coefficient for the
interaction variable (TG R&D ratio*TG IP institu-
tions) is negative and significant at P< 0.01. Since the
interaction effect depends on other covariates, we rely
on recommendations by Ai and Norton (2003) and
Hoetker (2007) and follow the approach of Norton
et al. (2004) to compute the correct marginal effect of
a change in two interacted variables for a logit model.
Figure 1 plots the interaction effect of TG R&D ratio
and TG IP Institutions. As documented, the interaction
effect is positive for firms with a predicted probability
of engaging in full acquisition above 0.2 and for about
half of firms with a predicted probability of engaging
in full acquisition below 0.2. This finding suggests that
EMNEs are more likely to choose partial over full
acquisition mode if the acquisition involves a target
firm with high R&D capability and located in a coun-
try with strong IP institutions.
We could not find any support for Hypotheses 3.
The coefficient is statistically insignificant. This find-
ing contradicts with Contractor et al. (2014) who sug-
gested that acquirers may be able to develop strategies
for completing the acquisition processes in an effi-
cient manner when the sector distance is low. Our
findings tend to indicate that sectoral distance
between acquirer and target plays limited role in the
choice of equity ownership in CBAs by EMNEs. This
could partly be explained by the fact that EMNEs
may be able to develop strategies for completing
acquisition process in an efficient manner regardless
of sectoral distance.
With regard to control variables, the coefficients
for both cultural distance and TG country risks are
insignificant. This is inconsistent with findings of
Contractor et al. (2014) and Chari and Chang (2009).
A possible explanation on this is that emerging econ-
omy multinationals with experience of volatile mar-
kets and bad economic policies of their home
countries have developed the ability to cope with poor
infrastructure, corrupt bureaucracies and regulatory
uncertainties (Ramamurti, 2009).
The findings for all explanatory variables are robust
to the inclusion of different set of control variables,
that is, target firm size (by log of employee and sales)
as well as target firms’ ROA and profit ratio.
5. Discussion
The findings of our article suggest that the choice of
equity ownership share sought in CBAs by MNEs
from BRICs is a complex decision influenced by
R&D capabilities and the degree of strength of IP
institutions. Our findings support the key theoretical
explanations and intellectual insights provided by
RBV, TCE and institutional theory.
Our findings suggest that MNEs from BRICS are
likely to pursue a full acquisition when target firms
from developed countries have higher R&D capabil-
ities. This finding provides support for the importance
of KBAs in international acquisitions (Slangen and
Hennart, 2007) and extends empirical support to the
theoretical perspectives on KBAs put forwarded by
the RBV (Barney (1991). In order to overcome
resource constraint issues, especially in the form of
KBAs (Rui and Yip, 2008), MNEs from BRICs pur-
sue full acquisitions, and acquire target firms with
higher R&D capabilities. A partial acquisition may
not compensate for the resource deficiencies, and may
not provide full control over the R&D capabilities of
the target firm. Therefore, by acquiring firms with
R&D capabilities, MNEs from BRICs can fully
exploit those R&D capabilities, and create a competi-
tive advantage in foreign countries.
Our findings also indicate that strong IP institutions
in target countries are more likely to drive EMNEs to
choose full over partial acquisitions. Specifically, the
strength of IP institutions of European countries has
an important determinant effect on EMNEs invest-
ment in full rather than partial acquisitions. This find-
ing can be attributed to the fact that EMNEs,
generally, are exposed to IP institutions in home coun-
tries that are predominantly weak in terms of strength.
The weak IP institutional context does not act as a sig-
nificant barrier for EMNEs to exploit their invest-
ments in R&D at home as they use complementary
know-how and resources internally (akin to developed
MNEs operating in emerging economies with weak
IP institutions) to appropriate value from their R&D
investments (Zhao, 2006). However, this can act as a
significant barrier for EMNEs operating in developed
economies with a strong IP institutional context, as
they will be required to invest significantly in organi-
sational learning to strengthen and improve R&D and
-1
-.5
0
.5
In
te
ra
ct
io
n 
E
ffe
ct
 (p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
)
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Predicted Probability that y = 1
Correct interaction effect Incorrect marginal effect
Figure 1. Interaction effects after Logit. [Colour figure can be
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Evidence from BRICS acquirers in Europe
R&D Management 00, 00, 2017 11VC 2017 RADMA and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
IP management. The problems in post-acquisition
phase can proliferate further if the target firm is par-
tially acquired, as integration costs between the
acquirer and target firm can be significantly higher
especially when faced with high IP institutional dis-
tance (Cording et al., 2008). A full acquisition of the
developed economy firm, however, should enable
EMNEs to mitigate uncertainty over potential IP
infringements, achieve strong enforceability and
therefore better appropriate value from their R&D
investments, while minimizing post-acquisition inte-
gration costs.
In addition, EMNEs are more likely to choose par-
tial over full acquisition mode if the acquisition
involves a target firm with high R&D capability and
located in a country with strong IP institutions. The
logic implied here is that EMNEs are faced, ex-ante,
with high monitoring costs and uncertainty over
screening their targets in a host country with strong IP
institutions. The problem associated with monitoring
and screening gets compounded when target firms
embedded in these strong IP institutions also have
high levels of R&D capabilities. In other words, the
information asymmetry between acquirers and target
firms increase with firms facing high IP institutional
distance and when the target firm has better R&D
capabilities. This can potentially lead to expensive
lawsuits in the post-acquisition phase, and might par-
ticularly lead to the diminishment of the R&D assets
of the acquired firm. In order to mitigate such an issue,
EMNEs are likely to choose partial over full acquisi-
tions as the adoption of a partial acquisition mode will
enable EMNEs to create and take advantage of the
‘hostage effect’ (Chen and Hennart, 2004).
5.1. Theoretical implications
Previous studies analysing ownership strategy aspects
have mostly focused on CBAs undertaken by Japa-
nese MNEs (e.g., Chen, 2008), CBAs undertaken by
multiple foreign MNEs in selected transition econo-
mies (e.g., Contractor et al., 2014) or CBAs under-
taken by emerging economyMNEs for the purpose of
developing new resources and skills (Elango and Patt-
naik, 2011). Our study offers insights into CBAs by
emerging economies.
In addition to contributing and extending the theo-
retical relevance of RBV, especially in the context of
EMNEs, this article also contributes to the R&D liter-
ature by focusing how important R&D activities are
for MNEs (especially from emerging markets) as
these are firm-specific KBAs that are required to
engage and compete effectively in foreign markets
(Markusen, 2002). The article, by utilising theoretical
insights from RBV (Slangen and Hennart, 2007), also
provides further empirical evidence regarding the role
of R&D capabilities in explaining successful interna-
tionalization of MNEs (Filatotchev and Piesse, 2009;
Purkayastha et al., 2016). A lack of research exists
examining the role of R&D capabilities in choice of
ownership share sought in CBAs by MNEs from
BRICS. Our article contributes by investigating the
role of R&D capabilities in deciding full versus partial
acquisitions. Acquisition provides EMNEs with an
opportunity to access R&D capabilities of target
firms. However, a partial acquisition may not provide
EMNEs with an opportunity to fully access and
exploit those KBAs. The findings of our article indi-
cate that MNEs from BRICS will pursue full acquisi-
tions when the target firm from developed countries
possesses high R&D capabilities.
The evidence of this study also contributes to
TCE and institutional theory by suggesting that the
strength of IP institutions of European countries has
an important determinant effect on choice of
EMNEs ownership equity share in CBAs. EMNEs
are more likely to fully acquire firms in European
countries that are characterised by strong IP sys-
tems. Target firms operating in strong IP institutions
can achieve stronger R&D performance and higher
returns to their R&D investments. This is desirable
since it can enable the acquiring EMNEs to more
efficiently exploit the KBAs acquired. Furthermore,
EMNEs acquiring target firms in countries with
strong IP institutions often pay a premium in order
to complete such acquisitions (Coff, 2003). There-
fore, by engaging in a full acquisition, EMNEs are
able to fully appropriate the returns of their invest-
ment. Moreover, since EMNEs operate in home
countries with weak IP institutions, the full acquisi-
tion of target companies located in strong IP institu-
tions can mitigate the co-operation perils of partial
acquisitions, such as the potential clash between
the different innovation cultures of the two parties
(Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005; Cording et al., 2008).
However, the empirical evidence also suggests that
when EMNEs acquire target firms with higher level
of R&D capabilities in host countries with strong IP
institutions, they are more likely to undertake partial
rather than full acquisitions. This is because in such
acquisitions, the potential difficulty for EMNEs to
engage in an ex ante accurate screening of the cer-
tainty and future potential of the high value KBAs
in a strong IP institutional context (due to informa-
tion asymmetry), lead them to partially acquire the
target firm. This can enable the EMNE to take
advantage of the ‘hostage effect’ by leaving a stake
to the sellers of the target firm (Chen and Hennart,
2004). This way, the EMNEs minimize the risk of
potential misinformation or misrepresentation of
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information by the sellers, that could lead (for exam-
ple) to future IP legal lawsuits by competitors in the
strong IP institutional regime of the host country,
which could adversely impact the value of the
acquired KBAs.
5.2. Managerial implications
Our study has some useful implications for the man-
agers of MNEs from BRICS aspiring to enter the
European market via CBA.
Firstly, managers should assess R&D capabilities
of the target firm before making the decision regard-
ing the full or partial acquisition. Managers of
EMNEs should carry out full acquisition in order to
gain full control over the R&D capabilities of target
firms from developed economies. In general, EMNEs
lack the resources, especially KBAs such as R&D
capabilities, which underpin success in foreign mar-
kets. Facing serious resource limitations, EMNEs
needs external resources such as R&D capabilities
that can compensate for resource deficiencies and can
create long term competitive advantage. An acquisi-
tion can allow EMNs to access the unique and valua-
ble R&D capabilities of firms from developed
economies. However, a partial acquisition will not
provide EMNE complete control and ownership of
the R&D capabilities. To gain greater operational
control over the R&D capabilities of target firms from
developed economies, EMNEs should pursue a full
acquisition.
Secondly, managers should also assess the strength
of IP institutions regime of the host country before
making the decision regarding the full or partial
acquisition. EMNEs have a strong incentive to fully
acquire firms operating in countries with strong IP
institutions; this is because in strong IP institutions,
the full acquisition of the investments in R&D is
expected to achieve strong enforceability and there-
fore reach higher appropriability value. Thus, man-
ager aiming to enhance R&D performance and higher
return on R&D investment should fully acquire firms
in European countries with strong IP institutions.
Thirdly, managers should pursue full acquisitions
in developed market due to some unique benefits. As
a consequence of entering late into the international
marketplace, BRICS MNEs are motivated to spring-
board into international prominence thus bypassing
intermediate modes of governance to assume full
ownership in CBAs. This internationalisation
approach allows BRICS MNEs to avoid the problems
of managing co-ownership relationships as well as the
difficulties of valuation in partial acquisition.
5.3. Limitations and future work
Firstly, consistent with most prior research in the area,
we analyse only a subset of entry modes in this study.
To the extent that consideration of other entry modes
systematically bears on the share of equity sought in
CBAs, our results could be affected. It would be a use-
ful course for further research on the topic to include
other modes of entry within the analysis to address
this limitation. Secondly, given our focus on the target
firm in this study, we did not explicitly incorporate
factors that may be salient from acquirer firms’ per-
spective. Further research from both the target and
acquirer firms’ perspective can help identify salient
seller/buyer side factors and complement findings in
this study. Thirdly, our study only addresses CBAs
from the perspective of ownership strategy. There-
fore, other aspects of CBAs (such as post-acquisition
integration, knowledge transfer strategy, etc.) are not
addressed in our article. Fourthly, despite using
robustness checks to control for firm size and per-
formance using number of employees, sales, profit
ratio and ROA, we were not able to adjust for industry
returns in ROA because of lack of data availability.
Finally, our study analysed acquisition entry strategy
in BRICS. There are different patterns of institutional
changes among different transition economies. There-
fore, we suggest that future research may incorporate
other emerging markets especially in Asia and Africa
into their research design based on key determinants
identified in this study.
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